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Abstract 
P2P (Online Peer-to-Peer) lending provides an open marketplace where borrowers 
make requests for loans by lenders who subsequently decide whether to bid or not 
following an examination of the relevant information posted by borrowers. In this P2P 
lending context, the leaderboard, where popular loan requests are displayed at the 
web’s front page, provides information for lenders to use when evaluating the requests. 
We empirically examine the effects of leaderboard information regarding the most 
popular existing loan requests. Our results show that the leaderboard information 
works ex ante in attracting additional bids to get loan requests successfully financed. 
However, it does not work ex post in improving the performance so that it has less 
potential for default. 
Keywords: P2P lending, leaderboard, Information Asymmetry, Wisdom of Crowds 
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Introduction 
P2P lending has recently become a popular business research field not only because it has witnessed 
substantial growth, but also because information asymmetry issues exist and result in investors having a 
limited amount of information with which to distinguish between good and bad borrowers (e.g., Puro et 
al. 2010; Puro et al. 2011). Signaling is expected to mitigate the adverse selection problem in Akerlof’s 
“lemon” market and P2P lending (Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1973; Lin et al. Forthcoming). Regarding the P2P 
lending site investigated in this study, the leaderboard which contains existing loan requests is displayed 
on the site’s front page. This unique method of sharing information regarding the choices of others offers 
the ideal environment in which the existence of signaling effects can be tested. Although the bestseller 
effect has previously been addressed in studies in the fields of economics (e.g., Sorensen 2007; Banerjee 
1992; Bikhchandani et al. 1992; Cai et al. 2009) and IS (e.g., Duan et al. 2009) and herding behavior in 
P2P lending market has been explored (e.g., Zhang and Liu. 2012; Herzenstein et al. 2011), this paper is 
the first to explore the impact of the leaderboard effect in the context of P2P lending. We empirically study 
the relationship between the likelihood of being financed and loan performance and the information on 
the leaderboard.  
P2P lending represents an open marketplace for loans provided not by a bank, but by individuals online 
taking advantage of P2P architecture. In P2P lending, financial transactions are facilitated directly 
between individuals (“peers”). Potential borrowers create and post listings with an overview of their need 
for a loan, while potential lenders place bids on listings they would be interested in funding. A borrower is 
then provided a loan only in the case that his or her listing garners enough bids to exceed a predefined 
amount or to fulfill a loan request by a number of lenders. A market study by the Gartner Group forecasts 
that the scope of P2P lending will soar by at least 66% to US$5 billion in outstanding loans by 2013 
(Gartner 2010). The wisdom of crowds is said to enable businesses to make profits when social networks 
try to establish the concept of a community into the decision making process. The underwriting decisions 
assessing the risk of each loan on a micro-lending site are made by individuals, while the value of a loan is 
established through lender bidding. When considering the context of borrowers, such lending decisions, 
which are attributed to the “wisdom of crowds” (Surowiecki, 2004; Bonabeau, 2009), are expected to be 
superior to the same decisions currently made by loan officials at banks as the collective intelligence 
experiment shows (Wolley at al., 2010).  
Before we take the wisdom of crowds in haste, it is better to consider literature on adverse selection and 
signaling that is applicable to the P2P lending market in which there exist information asymmetry 
problems. Akerlof’s (1970) used car “lemon” market crowds out sellers of high quality cars, leading to 
market failure. Even though the difficulty exists that quality discovery of non-standardized and complex 
products will increase transaction costs, many successful electronic auction markets deal in seemingly 
typical “lemon” goods. Signaling is expected to mitigate the adverse selection problem in the lemon 
market according to Spence (1973). In his job market model, education is a signal of quality. High quality 
workers signal their quality through education. The implication is that educated workers should have 
better ex-ante outcomes, i.e. getting employed and ex-post results, and thus have better job performance. 
Lin et al. (Forthcoming) apply this theory to the borrower’s friendship signal in P2P lending to show that 
if a borrower's friendship signals better borrower quality, borrowers with friends should have a higher 
likelihood of getting their requests financed, while ex-ante and borrowers with friends should default less 
given their higher intrinsic quality, ex-post.  
The leaderboard of existing loan requests is displayed on the P2P lending site’s front page. It displays 
information about the “Top 8” most financed requests in terms of the percentages for the respective 
requested amounts so that all potential lenders can easily find popular loan requests. We intend to 
examine the effect of the leaderboard on the likelihood of being financed and loan performance. 
Following the aforementioned description, our research questions are as follows:  
1. Does the leaderboard information influence whether a loan request is financed successfully? 
2. Does the leaderboard information have predictive power regarding the loan’s performance or the 
default rate? 
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The results show that the leaderboard information works ex ante, thus attracting additional bids to get 
requests financed. However, it does not work ex post and lacks a correlation with the default rate.  
This paper is organized as follows: Studies related to the theories of information asymmetry and adverse 
selection, are briefly reviewed. Previous research on the effects of leaderboard, as well as reviews of 
studies on P2P lending is briefly presented. The data set used in this study is then introduced. After we 
describe the construction of the model and introduce the underlying methods, the results are presented. 
The discussion follows. 
Literature Review 
On a P2P lending web site, the information provided by the intermediary is likely to work as a signal as 
potential lenders face and struggle to overcome information asymmetry issues due to limited information 
on the credit of potential borrowers. Another approach to mitigate issues related to information 
asymmetry in the loan market is credit rationing as presented by Stilglitz et al. (1981). Social networks 
with Web 2.0 features found in P2P lending sites have been analyzed in the research of Lin et al. 
(Forthcoming), which explained the effects and patterns of social networks on the fundability and 
appropriateness of a repayment. The intervention and coordination of groups and group leaders play a 
key role in full funding and loan performance according to the study by Freedman and Jin (2011), while 
Collie and Hampshire (2010) pointed out signals enhancing community reputation in order to reduce 
adverse selection and moral hazard risk. Lending strategies in P2P lending have also been analyzed in 
regard to the effectiveness of the group’s reputation. Findings have shown that having a low final rate and 
getting the loan funded, as well as bidding behavior, is not homogeneous among bidders (Puro et al. 
2011). Herzenstein et al. (2011) analyzed the incentives to herd and found herding behavior in P2P 
lending to be sub-optimal and that lenders show strategic herding behavior up to a threshold point. Shen 
et al. (2010) found that P2P lending site users follow herds rather than profit. That is, herding takes place 
when lenders make investments on loan listings, rather than on more rational investments based on risk 
and returns. Lee and Lee (2012) investigates herding behavior empirically in the P2P lending market in 
which seemingly conflicting conditions and features of herding exist. 
Theory regarding observational learning and information cascading presents a social learning mechanism 
(Banerjee 1992, Bikhchandani et al. 1992). These theories show that individuals make decisions with 
incomplete and inaccurate information. Consequently, people refer not only to their own information, but 
also to the actions of predecessors without any knowledge of the predecessors’ decision making process. 
The value of online reviews works as a good source of information. Dellarocas et al. (2007) find that the 
characteristics of online reviews can be a good predictor for box office sales of new released motion 
pictures. Zhu and Zhang (2010) find that the reviews are more influential and valuable for less popular 
product and consumers who are more internet-savvy. Herd behavior is particularly prominent in the IS 
field. Computer users frequently adopt popular software products consequently making them even more 
popular (Brynjolfsson and Kemerer 1996). Bid participation in eBay auction shows the herding pattern 
(Dholakia  and Soltysinki, 2001). Duan et al. (2009) empirically examined the impact of leaderboard 
information in the context of software adoption, while Ghose et al. (2009) found empirically that the 
monetary value of a click is not uniform across all positions in a search result. Herding behavior in the 
crowd-funding markets is empirically examined in terms of network externality (Burtch, 2011). 
Specifically in the P2p lending, Zhang et al. (2012) distinguish the rational herding and rational herding to 
find that obvious defects such as poor credit grades grow the herding momentum while favorable 
borrower characteristics like friend endorsements reduce the herding effect. 
Hypotheses 
While observational learning and herding may help attract bids and subsequently improve a loan’s 
chances of getting financed, a lender’s final profit depends on the quality of the loan decision. Herding can 
be found in many cases and investors may imitate investment decisions made for peculiar reasons. For 
example, restaurant patrons may choose to go to a busier restaurant with the expectation of higher quality. 
Herding is found to be a factor in non-diagnostic decisions in the context of online auctions (Simonsohn 
et al. 2008). Thus, it can be inferred that requests with more bids have a higher probability of being 
funded if requests are high on the leaderboard. In this light, the following statement is presented:  
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H1: Lenders’ choice of participation in bidding is significantly affected by the leaderboard. 
It is reasonable to infer that the more lenders participate in bidding, the more likely requests get financed. 
To cross check the leaderboard effect on getting financed, we present the following statement.   
H1a: The likelihood for requests to get financed is significantly affected by the leaderboard. 
Loan performance is measured by the likelihood of default. This study investigates the impact of the 
leaderboard through observational learning and herding in regard to the qualification assessment of 
borrowers. In other words, we examine whether a decision by lenders supported by observational learning 
really improves the quality of the decision when selecting the investment most likely to see repayment of 
invested funds and interest successfully. If the leaderboard is able to screen which borrowers are more 
likely to default, loans highly ranked on the leaderboard are more apt to be paid back in a timely manner. 
Positive association between herding in the P2P lending and its loan performance is found (Herzenstein et 
al., 2011). To clarify the effects of leaderboard, we present the hypothesis on loan outcomes relating to our 
investigation: 
H2: Requests which remain on the leaderboard longer have a lower likelihood of default and subsequent 
loss of loan.  
Data and Method 
Popfunding.com, one of the biggest P2P lending sites in Korea, presents an ideal environment for this 
study in that the site’s P2P lending market follows the rule of Dutch auctions for borrowers’ requests in 
the same format as found on Prosper.com and Zopa.com. This study focuses on transaction data collected 
from registration dates between July 1 and December 31, 2009. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Average number of bids on Nth day 
   *bid_num = the number of bids, lb/ub = lower bound / upper bound 
 
For the entire period, 2,470 requests for funding are generated, while 39,722 bids are made for those 
requests all outstanding over 15 days. Figure 1. shows the average number of bids on Nth day during the 
bid period. 
Bid Participation and the Likelihood of Being Financed 
The empirical attempt to quantify the effect of the leaderboard is found to be difficult due to the 
identification issues described by Manski (1993) in that the relationship between the leaderboard and the 
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number of bids could be bi-directional. In this study, the panel data set is constituted to clarify the 
causality of the number of bids from the leaderboard effect based on the fixed estimation model. The 
differences between two groups of on-the-leaderboard and others taken from previous dates are what are 
examined. Dummy variables, Leaderboardit-1, Leaderboardit-2,..., Leaderboardit-14 exhibit these differences 
where Leaderboardit-k is 1 if the loan request appears on the leaderboard on the day t-k, and zero if 
otherwise.  
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where yit is the dependent variable of the number of bids observed for each request i at time t, 
Leaderboardit-k (1 ≤ k ≤ 14) is the binary variable to identify if the request i is on the leaderboard on the 
day t-k and αi is the unobserved individual effect. The assumption that αi is not independent of 
Leaderboardit-k in that the requests are expected to be affected by specific daily situations and the specific 
context of the request, as well, is made. Total participation fluctuates along dates for various reasons. In 
order to control such variance, a panel negative binomial regression with fixed effect is included. 
Furthermore, dummy variable of request fixed effecti, is included to control the request specific 
unobserved effects. The influences of specific weekly changes, daily changes on the Nth day from the bid 
starting point, as well as the weekend effect, are investigated. Dummy variables of week fixed effectt, Nth 
dayt from the bid starting point at time t and binary variable of weekendt at time t are also added. 
To examine the influence of the leaderboard on the likelihood of being financed, the relationship between 
the number of days in the leaderboard and the likelihood of being financed is analyzed using a logit model. 
The dummy variable to hard and soft information and control variables are added as was done in previous 
research in P2P lending. 
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The probability that Yi= 1 is given in Equation (2), where β is the vector of coefficients to be estimated. 
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Discrete dependent variable in (3) represents the likelihood of being financed. 
Loan Performance 
Requests staying longer on the leaderboard are expected to have lower default rates. The relationship 
between the number of days on the leaderboard and the likelihood of default is analyzed using a logit 
model for the requests which succeeded in getting funded. Hard and soft information and control 
variables are added here, as well. 
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The probability that Yi= 1 is given in Equation (3), where β is the vector of coefficients to be estimated. 
Discrete dependent variable in (3) represents the likelihood of default. 
Furthermore, to release selection issues regarding the correlation between the error terms in equation (2) 
and (4), we perform Heckman estimation as we observe the loan performance only when the requests are 
financed.  
Results 
Regarding the results of testing the hypotheses, firstly for H1, the number of bids is found to be 
significantly affected by whether the request appeared on the leaderboard for the previous 7 days. The 
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dynamic panel regression of System GMM, as well as the panel and OLS regression, consistently show 
that the leaderboard effect from the previous day to 7 days prior influences the number of bids 
significantly, while the leaderboard effect of the previous day is interpreted as most influential as shown 
in Table 1. The reason that leaderboard_14 is dropped is that no request is listed on the leaderboard on 
day 1 as new requests tend to need more than a day to attract enough bids to get in the leaderboard. The 
coefficient for leaderboard_12 is stastistically significant prominently, which is presumed for new 
requests on the leaderboard to attract the interests of lenders, who would bookmark and participate in 
bidding toward the end of an auction.      
The number of bids made during the weekend is found to be fewer than those made during the week when 
the coefficients of the weekday dummies are statistically evaluated, thus inferring that lenders are 
participating in bids on weekdays rather than on weekends. Such a finding could be attributed to lenders 
being involved in P2P lending on business days rather than on non-business days.  
 
Table 1. Estimation of the Number of Bids Equation 
 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
Panel Regression  
with Fixed Effects 
(3) 
System GMM 
L_number_of_bids   
0.916*** 
(0.0451) 
leaderboard_1 
9.541*** 
(0.543) 
6.279*** 
(0.551) 
1.817** 
(0.8) 
leaderboard_2 
5.397*** 
(0.692) 
5.557*** 
(0.646) 
3.861*** 
(0.776) 
leaderboard_3 
1.943** 
(0.77) 
3.528*** 
(0.715) 
1.772** 
(0.849) 
leaderboard_4 
1.145 
(0.868) 
2.825*** 
(0.802) 
2.483*** 
(0.936) 
leaderboard_5 
0.714 
(0.978) 
2.389*** 
(0.907) 
2.170** 
(1.042) 
leaderboard_6 
1.759 
(1.134) 
3.258*** 
(1.052) 
3.604*** 
(1.2) 
leaderboard_7 
2.227 
(1.397) 
3.950*** 
(1.301) 
4.247*** 
(1.468) 
leaderboard_12 
20.31*** 
(5.946) 
20.48*** 
(5.555) 
21.76*** 
(6.455) 
weekend dummy 
-3.624*** 
(0.356) 
-3.821*** 
(0.346) 
-4.972*** 
(0.486) 
Observations 4,780 4,780 3,160 
R-squared 0.289 0.323  
Number of Requests 903 903 662 
a. Dependent variable is the number of bids. The values in parentheses are standard errors.  
All tests are two-tailed with * = 10%, ** = 5%, and *** = 1% significance. 
 
According to the results of the study, it is easily inferred that requests having more bids are more likely to 
be financed. For H1a, the likelihood of being financed is found to be significantly affected by the number 
of days in the leaderboard. The Logit regression shows that the coefficients for the number of days on the 
leaderboard and the dummy variable to identify whether the requests are on the leaderboard more than 
once are both statistically significant as shown in Table 2. Therefore, it is understood that the leaderboard 
information positively influences the lenders’ willingness to participate in bidding and the number of bids 
caused by the leaderboard effect will help requests on the leaderboard to get funded. Additonally, to 
examine the effect of soft and hard information pointed out in a previous study (Freedman et al. 2011), we 
find that the number of supporting documents submitted by borrowers is statistically significant.  
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Table 2. Results for Testing the Likelihood of Being Financed 
 (1) (2) (3) 
days on the leaderboard 
0.224*** 
(0.0485)  
0.0853* 
(0.049) 
0.188*** 
(0.056) 
leaderboard dummy 
3.284*** 
(0.442) 
2.696*** 
(0.417) 
1.647*** 
(0.479) 
Terms 
requested amount 
-5.39e-07** 
(2.25E-07)  
-1.70e-06*** 
(3.13E-07) 
repayment period 
-0.00802 
(0.0364)  
-0.00953 
(0.0485) 
interest 
-0.145*** 
(0.048)  
-0.315*** 
(0.0803) 
Soft Info. 
replies on the bulletin board 
 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
comments on the bulletin board 
 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
vote 
 
0.085*** 
(0.013) 
0.131*** 
(0.017) 
Hard Info. supporting documents 
 
0.267*** 
(0.078) 
0.526*** 
(0.101) 
Control 
age dummy Yes Yes Yes 
male 
0.134 
(0.217) 
0.117 
(0.235) 
-0.063 
(0.27) 
Observations 903 903 903 
b. Dependent variable is Getting Financed (1=Financed, 0=Not). The values in parentheses are standard errors.  
All tests are two-tailed with * = 10%, ** = 5%, and *** = 1% significance. 
 
However, for the H2, a request’s long stay on the leaderboard does not guarantee a lower likelihood of 
loan default in that we find no correlation or negative correlation between the number of days on the 
leaderboard and the likelihood of default. Heckman estimates on Table 3. consistently show that the 
leaderboard effects are not influential to the loan performance statistically. 
 
Table 3. Results for Testing the Likelihood of Default 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
(4) 
Heckman 
Financed(Select) 
   
17.72 
(2.084e+07) 
days on the leaderboard -0.175* 
(0.0986) 
-0.107 
(0.110) 
-0.397** 
(0.160) 
-0.015 
(0.011) 
leaderboard dummy 1.181 
(1.238) 
0.608 
(1.3) 
1.682 
(2.276) 
0.099 
(0.117) 
Terms 
requested amount 
1.01E-07 
(4.45E-07)  
1.56e-06* 
(9.20E-07) 
3.95e-08 
(5.64e-08) 
repayment period 
0.125 
(0.0808)  
0.260* 
(0.133) 
Yes 
Interest 
-0.0289 
(0.24)  
0.06 
(0.275) 
0.006 
(0.026) 
Soft 
Info. 
replies on the bulletin board 
 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.008 
(0.005) 
-0.0002 
(0.0003) 
comments on the bulletin board 
 
0.008 
(0.008) 
0.006 
(0.0114) 
0.0002 
(0.0004) 
Vote 
 
0.0751** 
(0.032) 
0.038 
(0.039) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
Q&As 
 
-0.016*** 
(0.003) 
-0.024*** 
(0.005) 
-0.0004*** 
(8.63e-05) 
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c. Dependent variable is the likelihood of default (1=Repaid on Time, 0=Default). 
The values in parentheses are standard errors. All tests are two-tailed with * = 10%, ** = 5%, and *** = 1% significance. 
The variables of the information presented on the P2P lending website, including the hard information 
which is significant for likelihood of being funded, are found not to have a clear correlation with the 
likelihood of default even though information on the friends’ networks of borrowers is identified as an 
effective signal in differentiating the borrowers who will have lower likelihood of default in a previous 
study (Lin et al. Forthcoming). 
 
Discussion 
In this study, we have attempted to analyze the respective impacts of leaderboard information by 
empirically investigating the impact of the leaderboard, which depends on changes in the percentage for 
the requested amount. Such analyses are done in the context of P2P lending, which provides a number of 
investment choices available to potential lenders as well as ranking chart information that illustrates 
which funding requests are getting comparatively more bids. While the P2P lending market represents an 
extreme case of information overload in which only a limited amount of information regarding borrowers 
can be seen, information about others’ participation in bidding could influence subsequent lenders’ 
decisions. By analyzing the panel and cross section data, we show that the lenders’ choice of bids is 
influenced by a funding request’s entry on the leaderboard. The findings are consistent with observational 
learning that show that individuals are very much influenced by the information inferred from others’ 
behavior in an online market. In P2P lending, the bids of lenders rely on the information provided by the 
intermediary. However, following the analysis undertaken in this study, it has been found that longer 
exposure on the leaderboard does not necessarily correlate to the likelihood of default. 
Screening mechanism for bad borrowers is one of the most important characteristics of the P2P lending 
market. However, it is observed in this case that rational screening such as the wisdom of crowds in the 
P2P lending market does not work properly when the leaderboard forces bidders to obtain certain 
information regarding requests. Instead, a type of irrational herding caused by given information occurs 
as a signaling effect. While the analysis in this study focuses mainly on lenders’ participation in bids for 
funding requests by potential borrowers, the results from the analysis have implications for e-commerce 
intermediaries, as well. It is recommended that an intermediary should manage the ranking information 
and review the feasibility of underwriting to verify loan requests to the extent possible by providing 
lenders with a sense of assurance, as well as with an anti-fraud index. Effective underwriting is hard to 
realize, requires a large input of labor, and is thus consequently expensive. As such, providing 
underwriting information on a P2P lending site will act as a ‘double-edged sword,’ both securing asset 
stability while at the same time not allowing the customer base to grow within a short amount of time. As 
Venkatesan et al. (2007) show, market characteristics should be considered together with retailer 
characteristics for the better performances of online markets. From the perspective of this research, an 
intermediary may well provide the underwriting information about requests that are on the leaderboard.  
In light of the results of this study, there are many areas which can be improved upon in future studies. 
Future studies should extend to a more thorough analysis of the slot effect within the leaderboard and any 
comments posted along with the requests, as well as those on the community bulletin board. The 
empirical analysis undertaken in this study is not able to distinguish totally rational and irrational 
herding. Herding resulting from informational cascades is rational in that decision makers integrate 
antecedents’ actions into their own decisions (Duan et al., 2009). The development of a measurement 
apparatus for non-rational herding should be a suitable topic for further exploration in later studies. 
Hard 
Info. 
supporting documents 
 
-0.0637 
(0.205) 
-0.31 
(0.263) 
-0.011 
(0.017) 
Control age dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Male 
-0.293 
(0.482) 
-0.990* 
(0.578) 
-0.78 
(0.655) 
-0.055 
(0.047) 
Observations 
196 196 196 
199(Uncensored) 
704(Censored) 
 Do et al. / The Leaderboard effect in P2P Lending 
 Thirty Third International Conference on Information Systems, Orlando 2012 9 
References 
Akerlof, G. 1970. The Market for Lemons: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics. 84(3), pp. 488-500. 
Banerjee, Abhijit, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior. 1992. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 107(3), pp. 
797-817. 
Bikhchandani, S., Hirshleifer, D. and Welch, I. 1992. A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural 
Change as Informational Cascades. Journal of Political Economy. 100(5). 
Bonabeau, E. Decisions 2.0: The Power of Collective Intelligence. 2009. MIT Sloan Management Review, 
50(2). 
Brynjolfsson, E. and Kemerer, C. F. 1996. Network Externalities in Microcomputer Software: An 
Econometric Analysis of the Spreadsheet Market. Management Science. 42(12). 
Burtch, G. Herding Behavior as a Network Externality, 2011. ICIS 2011 proceedings, Thirty Second 
International Conference on Information Systems, Shanghai. 
Collie, B. and Hampshire, R. 2010. Sending mixed signals: multilevel reputation effects in peer-to-peer 
lending markets. Proceedings of the ACM conference on Computer.  
Dellarocas, C., Zhang, X. and Awad, N. 2007. Exploring the Value of Online Product Reviews in 
Forecasting Sales: The Case of Motion Pictures. Journal of Interactive Marketing, 21(4), pp 2-20. 
Dholakia, U., and Soltysinski, K. Coveted or overlooked? The psychology of bidding for comparable 
listings in digital auctions. 2001. Marketing Letters. 
Duan, W., Gu, B. and Whinston, A.B. 2009. Informational Cascades and Software Adoption on the 
Internet: An Empirical Investigation. MIS Quarterly. 33(1), pp. 23-48. 
Feng Zhu, Xiaoquan (Michael) Zhang. 2010. "Impact of Online Consumer Reviews on Sales: The 
Moderating Role of Product and Consumer Characteristics,"  Journal of Marketing, 74(2), pp 133-148. 
Freedman, S. and Jin, Z. 2011. Learning by Doing with Asymmetric Information: Evidence from 
Prosper.com. NBER Working Paper. 16855.  
Gartner Reports. 2010. Predicts 2010: Operational Technologies Present Threats and Opportunities in 
Banking and Investment Services. 
Ghose, A. and Yang, S. 2009. An empirical analysis of search engine advertising: Sponsored Search in 
Electronic Markets. Management Science. 55 (10). 
Herzenstein, M., U. M. Dholakia, R. L. Andrews. 2011. Strategic herding behavior in peer-to-peer loan 
auctions. J. Interactive Marketing 25(1). 
Lee, E., and Lee, B. 2012. Herding behavior in online P2P lending: An empirical investigation. Electron. 
Comm. Res. Appl.  
Lin, M., Prabhala, N. and Viswanathan, forthcoming, S.  Judging Borrowers by the Company They Keep: 
Friendship Networks and Information Asymmetry in Online Peer-to-Peer Lending. Management Science. 
Manski, C. 1993. Identification of Exogenous Social Effects: The Reflection Problem. Review of Economics 
Studies. 60(1), pp. 31-42. 
Puro, L., Teich, J.E., Wallenius, H. and Wallenius J., 2010. Borrower Decision Aid for people-to-people 
lending. Decision Support Systems. 49, pp. 52–60. 
Puro, L., Teich, J.E., Wallenius, H. and Wallenius, J. 2011. Bidding strategies for real-life small loan 
auctions. Decision Support Systems. 51, pp. 31-41. 
Shen, D., Krumme, C and Lippman, A. 2010. Follow the Profit or the Herd? Exploring Social Effects in 
Peer-to-Peer Lending. IEEE Conference.  
Economics and Value of IS 
10 Thirty Third International Conference on Information Systems, Orlando 2012  
Simonsohn, U. and Ariely, D. 2008. When Rational Sellers Face Non-Rational Buyers: Evidence from 
Herding on eBay. Management Science. 54(9), pp. 1624–1637. 
Sorensen, A. T. 2007. Bestseller Lists and Product Variety. The Journal of Industrial Econ. 
Spence, M. 1973. Job Market Signaling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 87(3) 
Stiglitz, J. and Weiss, A. 1981. Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information. The American 
Economic Review 71(3), pp. 393-410. 
Surowiecki, J. 2004. The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many Are Smarter Than the Few and How 
Collective Wisdom Shapes Business, Economies, Societies and Nations, Doubleday. 
Venkatesan, R., Mehta, K. and Bapna, R. 2007. Do Market Characteristics Impact the Relationship 
between Retailer Characteristics and Online Prices,"  Journal of Retailing, 83(3), pp 309-324. 
Woolley, A., Williams, C., Pentland, A., Hashmi, N. and Malone, T. 2010. Evidence for a Collective 
Intelligence Factor in the Performance of Human Groups, Science. 
Zhang and Liu, 2012. Rational Herding in Microloan Markets, Management Science 58(5). 
 
